Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert S. Campbell; Sheleigh A. Chalkley; Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage and Campbell; Attorney
for Defendants/Appellees.
John C. Green; Kim M. Luhn; Green and Luhn; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant .
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake Knee and Sports v. Salt Lake City Knee and Sports, No. 981282 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1678
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION INC. f/k/a 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah General Partnership and 
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., P.C. a Utah 
Professional Corporation, and THOMAS D. 
ROSENBERG, M.D., a Utah Professional 
Corporation, General Partners, 
Defendants/Appellees 
Case No. 98X1282 






X g T W' <W72Z 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT SALT LAKE KNEE & 
SPORTS REHABILITATION, INC. 
APPEAL FROM ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BY THE 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL - 0557 
CAMPBELL MOXLEY & CAMPBELL 
Broadway Center, Suite 880 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-9600 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
JOHN C. GREEN-1242 
KIM M. LUHN-5105 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Cow*.of APP**** 
JAN 1 3 1999 
Julia D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION INC. f/k/a 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah General Partnership and 
LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D., P.C. a Utah 
Professional Corporation, and THOMAS D. 
ROSENBERG, M.D., a Utah Professional 
Corporation, General Partners, 
Defendants/Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT SALT LAKE KNEE & 
SPORTS REHABILITATION, INC. 
APPEAL FROM ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BY THE 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
JOHN C. GREEN-1242 
KIM M. LUHN-5105 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL - 0557 
CAMPBELL MOXLEY & CAMPBELL 
Broadway Center, Suite 880 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-9600 
Case No. 9841282 
District Court No. 910906316 CN, 
Argument Priority 
Classification 15 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure .... 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF STATEMENT 15 
ARGUMENTS 16 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEES' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS THAT THE 
SALE OF THE SUBJECT BUSINESS DID NOT INCLUDE THE 
SALE OF ITS NAME. INSTEAD, THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT 
WHERE THE GOODWILL OF A BUSINESS IS BEING SOLD, 
THE SALE IMPLICITLY INCLUDES THE SALE OF THE 
NAME OF THE BUSINESS. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE 
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
THE FACE OF DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT. 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDA 
A. TERMINATION AGREEMENT AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
B. DECISION 
C. MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
D. PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S ORDER ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
F. AFFIDAVITS OF GENE OAKS, LLOYD MAYER AND JAMIE BEERS 
11 
<i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1992) 11 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County 855 P.2d 231,235 (Utah 1993) 2 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort 808 P.2d 1037,1040 (Utah 1991) 2 
909 P.2d 266 (Utah App 1995) 15,13 
Southern Utah Mortuary v. Olpin 776 P.2d 945, 948 (Utah App. 1989) 17,18 
Sorensen v. Sorensen 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989) 17 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal of an order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Appellees, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and 
Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., and dismissing the Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & 
Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.'s Complaint for Declaratory Relief. The action involves a 
dispute between the parties as to their respective rights and status under the Termination 
Agreement and Purchase Agreement entered into between them. The order was entered 
by Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). Originally, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1996) as the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. However, pursuant to Notice dated June 1, 1998, the Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting the Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the basis that the sale of Appellees' interest in the subject business 
1 
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did not include the sale of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" sinjiply because 
the name was not expressly listed in the documents as an asset sold? 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in the face c|>f genuine 
issues of material fact? 
Because this case was decided on summary judgment, the issues are issues of law. 
Therefore, the trial court's determination is accorded no deference by the appellate court. 
but it is reviewed for correctness. (Higgins v. Salt Lake County 855 P.2d 2. 
1993); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991).) Summary 
judgment is precluded where issues of material fact remain unresolved. FinMly, in 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court must view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the noq-moving 
party. (See Higgins 855 P.2d at 233, and Clover. 808 P.2d at 1039.) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Motion and proceeding thereon. The motion shall be 
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sough shall be rendered 
forthwith of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
1,235 (Utah 
1 
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is genuine issue as to the amount 
of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., (hereinafter 
"Rehabilitation" or "Appellant") filed its Complaint for Declaratory Relief on October 4, 
1991 seeking a declaratory judgment that a transaction by and between the Appellees and 
IHC Hospitals, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "IHC") on or about May 24, 1990 
constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement and Purchase 
Agreement by and between the parties to this action (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Termination Agreement"). Pursuant to the Termination Agreement, if the transaction 
was in fact a "sale", Rehabilitation is entitled to payment from the Appellees in an amount 
equal to one-third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of goodwill. (R. 2-
29.) Subsequently, the Appellees filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim alleging 
that Rehabilitation breached certain non-competition provisions of the Termination 
Agreement. The Counterclaim was later dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the 
3 
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parties. (R. 143-165.) The Order of Dismissal was entered by the court on 
1994. (R. 411.) 
The Appellees, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. Pauloi, M.D., P.C. 
and Thomas D. Rosenberg M.D., P.C. filed their first Motion for Summary 
February 16, 
Judgment on 
or about June 15, 1993, alleging that Rehabilitation could not produce evidence sufficient 
to avoid dismissal of its claims on summary judgment. (R. 168-170 and 171-196.) 
Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that the 
transaction between the Appellees and IHC on or about May 24, 1990 was in fact a "sale" 
as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation was entitled 
to judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be proven at trial representing one 
third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of good will. Rehabi 
further moved the court for summary judgment dismissing the Appellees' Counterclaims 
with prejudice. The court granted the Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment; denied 
the countermotion; and dismissed Rehabilitation's Complaint with prejudice. (R. 494-95.) 
Rehabilitation filed its Notice of Appeal on or about April 11, 1994. (R. 417-18.) 
The Court of Appeals reversed the Order of Summary Judgment and remanded the case to 
the trial court to resolve what it determined was the sole remaining factual issue, that is, 
itation 
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whether the joint venture continued to operate at the same location under the same name 
after the May 24, 1990 transaction. (Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation v. Salt Lake 
Knee & Sports Medicine 909 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah App 1995)) After some additional 
discovery, the Appellees filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court 
subsequently granted on the basis that, since the May, 1990 purchase documents do not 
expressly list the name of the business "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" as an asset 
being sold, it was not sold. Therefore, the requirements of the Termination Agreement 
had not been satisfied, and Appellant is not entitled to the relief requested. The order was 
entered on February 10, 1998; it was modified by Order Granting Plaintiffs Objection to 
Defendants Order on Summary Judgment dated April 3, 1998; the notice of appeal was 
filed on April 28, 1998; and the case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court by 
notice dated June 1, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to May 22, 1989, the parties to this action were working together to 
provide medical and physical therapy services at the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
located at 670 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
the "Center") pursuant to the terms of a Professional Services Contract and Lease 
5 
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Agreement entered into by the parties in 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Services Contract".) (R. 202, 234 and 238.) 
2. At all times pertinent hereto, the Appellees, Salt Lake City Knee |& Medicine 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Medicine") was a Utah general partnership and the 
Defendants, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C. and Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D.J 
the general partners of Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine (hereinafter sometimes referred 
to as "Paulos" and "Rosenberg".) (For brevity, when being referred to as a gipup, all 
defendants will be referred to as "Appellees".) (R. 202.) 
3. Prior to the termination of the Professional Services Contract, the 
P.C., were 
parties to this 
action became involved in negotiations with IHC Hospitals, Inc. (hereinafter referred to 
as "IHC") for the purchase of the Center. Negotiations were also ongoing wjth HCA/St. 
Marks. (R. 202,234 and 239.) 
4. On or about January 19, 1989, Doug Toole, a principal of Rehabilitation, 
informed Rosenberg and Paulos that he and Greg Gardner, another principal 
Rehabilitation, were not willing to terminate their business relationship with 
Hospital in order to work exclusively with IHC. Paulos left the room and returned with a 
of 
Holy Cross 
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Notice of Termination dated January 19, 1989, terminating the Professional Services 
Contract. (R. 203 and 239.) 
5. On or about May 22, 1989, the parties entered into a Termination Agreement 
and Purchase Agreement which outlined the agreement of the parties with respect to their 
respective rights and obligations on termination, (hereinafter "Termination Agreement"). 
Attorneys for Appellees drafted the Termination Agreement. (R. 203, 234-35, and 239-
40.) 
6. At issue in this case are the provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement which states as follows: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two (2) years 
from the date of this Agreement, Physicians [Appellees 
herein] sells the Center to any third party, Rehabilitation shall 
be entitled to one third (1/3) of that portion of the purchase 
price which is attributed to good will. 'Sale' shall be defined 
as a transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and pays 
consideration for all of the following: the Center's lease on 
the Leased Sports Medicine Center, all of the equipment and 
other assets located at the Center, the Center's 
patient and accounts receivable, and whereby the purchaser 
assumes complete operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same name at the 
same location. 
(A copy of the Termination Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and is by 
reference made a part hereof.) (R. 8-15.) 
7 
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7. The only other consideration received by Rehabilitation for its in rerest in the 
Center was the sum of $33,929.00 which Rehabilitation was obligated to pa^ to certain 
lien holders to remove all encumbrances on the equipment which Rehabilitation was 
selling to the Appellees, and $6,000.00 paid as reimbursement for services provided 
Granite School District (See Addendum A) (R. 234-35, 239-40, and ^  7 of the 
Termination Agreement.) 
8. Approximately one year later, the Appellees entered into a series 
with IHC on May 24, 1990, for the purchase of an interest in the Center loc< 
East 3900 South as well as other Centers owned by Appellees located at 359 
and the part time clinic in Park City. These agreements included, but were 
the following: 
of agreements 
ted at 670 
8th Avenue 
hot limited to, 
a. The Appellees and IHC entered into an Asset Purchase 
Agreement whereby the Appellees purportedly sold to IHC an undivided 
one-half interest in all assets of the three facilities. The personal property 
sold is expressly defined in the Agreement and the description expressly 
includes "good will". (See f 1(a) of the Asset Purchase Agreement wpich 
was submitted for in camera review.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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b. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, the Appellees executed a Special Warranty Bill of Sale and 
Assignment whereby Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine transferred, 
assigned and conveyed to IHC the assets described above. It also expressly 
includes good will. (See the Special Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment 
submitted for in camera review). 
c. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, the Appellees and IHC Hospitals entered into a Joint Venture 
Agreement for Sports Medicine West wherein each of the parties agreed to 
contribute to the newly created joint venture their 50% undivided interest in 
the "Assets pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement", [sic] The Joint 
Venture Agreement also states it was formed to "develop, construct, 
finance, own and manage the Building and to own, manage, market and 
operate the Businesses", (see [^2.3 of the Joint Venture Agreement 
submitted for in camera review.) The reference to the "building" refers to 
the plans by the joint venture to construct a new building wherein the 
9 
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business of the two Centers would be conducted. One of the "Businesses' 
was the Center at 3900 South. 
d. Contemporaneously with the execution of all of the forego|ing, 
Appellees and IHC executed a Special Warranty Bill of Sale and 
Assignment whereby each transferred, assigned and conveyed to Sports 
Medicine West, their respective undivided one-half interests. It expressly 
lists "good will" as an asset being transferred. (See Special Warranty 
Sale and Assignment submitted for in camera review.) 
9. Subsequent to the execution of these documents, the joint venture 
Bill of 
continued to 
do business at the 3900 South Center under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" 
Although the parties disagree as to how long it continued, the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" was not changed to "Sports Medicine West" for a period or time which 
Appellees admit was at least four months, and it is Rehabilitation's contention that the 
name was not changed until almost one and one-half years later and only after 
Rehabilitation filed this law suit in October of 1991. (R. 235 and 241.) 
10. After learning of the transaction between the Appellees and IHC 
Rehabilitation requested information from Appellees concerning it. Appellees refused to 
10 
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provide any information on the basis that the transaction was not a "sale" as defined by 
the Termination Agreement. (R. 4.) Therefore, on or about October 4, 1991, 
Rehabilitation filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-33-1 (1992) seeking, among other things, an order declaring as follows: 
a. That a sale of the Center took place on or about the 24th day of 
May, 1990 between the Appellees and IHC; and 
b. That the sale was a "sale" within the meaning of the provisions of 
paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement between the parties and that 
Rehabilitation is entitled to one-third of any amounts attributable to good 
will. (R. 6-7.) 
11. Appellees filed an Answer on or about October 30, 1991 (R. 39) but 
subsequently, pursuant to Stipulation between the parties, filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim. (R. 143-65.) The Counterclaim was subsequently dismissed by stipulation 
of the parties. (R. 356-57 and 411-12.) 
12. On or about June 15, 1993, the Appellees filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment seeking to dismiss Rehabilitation's claims on the basis that Rehabilitation could 
produce no evidence in support of its position that the transaction between the Appellees 
11 
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and IHC constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement. (R 
168-96.) 
13. Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking 
a declaration that the transaction between the Appellees and IHC was in fact) a "sale" as 
that term was defined in the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation 
to judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be proven at trial, representing one-
third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of good will. (R. 199J-225.) 
was entitled 
Contemporaneously, Rehabilitation submitted the documents executed by th| p Appellees 
bout August and IHC for in camera review pursuant to the Protective Order dated on or \ 
17, 1992. (R. 226-28 and 464.) 
14. The Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; denied 
Rehabilitation's counter motion; and the order was entered on December 6, 
358-360.) 
993. (R. 
15. After denial of Rehabilitation's Motion for Reconsideration, Rehabilitation 
filed its Notice of Appeal on April 11, 1994. (R. 417-418.) 
16. The appeal was poured over to the Utah Court of Appeals, (R. 4^9) which 
subsequently reversed the Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal with prejudice and 
12 
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remanded the case for the sole purpose of determining whether the joint venture 
continued operating at the same location under the same name after the May 24, 1990 
transaction. If so, this court held that Rehabilitation would be entitled to an award of one-
third of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of goodwill. The Court of Appeals 
ruling concluded that all other requirements listed in paragraph 11 had been satisfied. (A 
copy of the decision is found at the end of volume 1 of the record and has been published 
at Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation v. Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine 909 P.2d 
266 (Utah App 1995) For the court's convenience, a copy is attached hereto as 
Addendum "B"). 
17. On or about the 19th day of December, 1997, after remand and some 
additional discovery, the Appellees filed another Motion for Summary Judgment, this 
time arguing that: 1) no part of the purchase price of the Center can be attributable to 
good will as the entire amount paid over and above the cost of tangible assets was for a 
non-competition agreement by the individual Appellees; and 2) because the documents do 
not expressly recite that the joint venture purchased the name, "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center," the name was not sold. As a result, the Appellees argued that the requirements 
of paragraph 11 have not been met. (Unfortunately, as counsel for Rehabilitation 
13 
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reviewed the record on appeal, the pages of volume two have not been numbered for 
citation on appeal. Therefore, precise citation is not available. Instead a cd>py of the 
motion and memorandum in support without exhibits are attached as addendum "C".) 
18. Rehabilitation's argument in opposition to summary judgment yas five fold. 
First, Rehabilitation argued that the documents do expressly and repeatedly 
good will was an asset being sold, and under the law, the name of a business is considered 
an element of goodwill. Second, nothing supports Appellees' argument thai monies paid 
were for non-competition agreements, and in fact, the documents establish otherwise. 
Third, evidence that the name continued to be used by the joint venture for ^t least four 
months (undisputed by Appellees) and as long as eighteen months after the 
transaction establishes that it was in fact sold. Fourth, at the very least, the evidence that 
the name was used creates a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment 
on the issue of whether the name was sold. Finally, Rehabilitation argued tljat this was 
recite that 
Jtfay 1990 
the first time this issue had been raised since the suit was filed in October off 
also at the very least, Appellant was entitled to continue the trial and condudt additional 
discovery. (See a copy of Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment without exhibits, attached as addendum "D".) 
1991,and 
14 
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19. After oral argument, the lower court granted Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The order was entered on February 10, 1998, and subsequently 
modified by Order Granting Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Order on Summary 
Judgment dated April 3, 1998. (See addendum "E" for copies of both.) 
20. The Notice of Appeal (originally designated as a cross-appeal) was filed on 
April 28, 1998. The matter was poured over to this court by notice dated June 1, 1998. 
(See last pages of volume 2.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in finding that the May 1990 transaction did not include the 
sale of the name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center and granting summary judgment 
against Rehabilitation on this basis. First, the sale issue on remand was whether the joint 
venture purchased continued to use the name after the sale. Next, the court's reliance on 
the omission of the name from the list of assets is contrary to the law. And, finally, if the 
issue is a factual one properly considered by the court, genuine issues of material fact 
preclude summary judgment. 
15 
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ARGUMENT 
On appeal is the lower court's dismissal of the Appellant's Complaiqt for 
Declaratory Relief by entry of its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Siimmary 
Order Judgment. The language of the Order must be read in conjunction with the 
Granting Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant's Order on Summary Judgment 
order struck certain language included in the original order. Reading the two orders 
together, the court's specific basis for granting summary judgment was as follows: 
The Court grants the Motion for Summary Judgment on the ba|sis 
that Plaintiff has failed to produce any competent evidence raising a 
genuine dispute of material fact on the issue that the name "Salt Lakel Sports 
Medicine Center" was sold to IHC or a third party. The Defendants 
produced unequivocal testimony that said name was not sold. [Language 
stricken by Order Granting Plaintiffs Objection] Plaintiff did not coipe 
forward with any competent evidence that the name was sold. 
Consequently, under Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement datbd 
May 22, 1989, Summary Judgment against the Plaintiffs, dismissing iheir 
complaint, is proper as a matter of law. 
To reach this conclusion, the court erred in two respects. First, the court erred in 
failing to apply the appropriate law to the Appellees' arguments on summary judgment, 
even before analyzing whether the facts were in dispute. Second, the evidenbe before the 
court clearly established a genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding summary 
judgment. To begin first with the error of law, in granting summary judgment, and 
This latter 
16 
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although some of this language was subsequently stricken, the court relied primarily on 
the fact that nowhere in the myriad of documents which encompass the IHC/joint venture 
transaction in this matter is the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" expressly listed 
as an asset being sold. However, in reaching this conclusion, the lower court wholly 
ignored the law, and the generally accepted definition of goodwill. 
Beginning first with the definition of "goodwill", this court has defined it as 
follows: 
Good will is a common law concept, defined variously as 'nothing 
more than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place,' 
. . . or 'the advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, 
beyond the mere value of the capital stock, funds, or property employed 
therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement 
which it receives from constant or habitual customers, on account of its 
local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or 
punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even 
from ancient partialities or prejudices.' 
Southern Utah Mortuary v. Olpin 776 P.2d 945, 948 (Utah App. 1989) citing Nims, The 
Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks. § 13 at 74-74 (4th ed. 1947). (See also, the 
definition of good will in the case of Sorensen v. Sorensen. 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 
1989) where this court added that "goodwill is referred to generally as 'the summation of 
all the special advantages, not otherwise identifiable, related to a going concern. It 
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includes such items as a good name, capable staff and personnel, high credit standing, 
reputation for superior products and services and favorable location." Id. (emphasis 
added).) 
The Court in Southern Utah Mortuary went on to hold that the omission of the 
word "goodwill" from documents comprising the sale of the business at issue therein did 
not mean that good will was not sold. Instead, this court stated that, "[g]ood will cannot 
be transferred apart from the business with which it is connected. Consequently, the sale 
of a business presumptively includes the sale of the business's good will, even though it is 
not specified." See Southern Utah Mortuary. 776 P. 2d at 748. And, although in the 
Southern Utah Mortuary case the seller had expressly sold the name to another party prior 
to the sale at issue on appeal, this Court recognized that "[gjood will may be represented 
by a trade mark or a trade name." Id. (emphasis added.) 
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is clear under the law that 
whether or not an asset is expressly mentioned in the documents encompassing the sale of 
a business does not mean that the asset was not sold. It is also clear that good will is that 
intangible for which a buyer is willing to pay in excess of the cost of the hard assets, and 
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this intangible includes by its very nature, the name and location of a business, as these 
are the elements most easily recognizable by the consuming public. 
Finally, although not expressly listed, the name was also not expressly excluded. 
Instead, it is clear from the description of the assets sold in the May, 1990 transaction that 
nothing was retained by Appellees and that the sale was inclusive of each and every 
interest in the Center. For example, paragraph la of the Asset Purchase Agreement states 
as follows: 
(a) Personal Property and Accounts. Seller's right, title and 
interest in and to all furniture, fixtures, equipment, appliances, 
inventory, uniforms, promotional materials, printed matters, 
supplies, books, records, prepaid expenses, prepaid taxes, 
prepaid contractual payments and deposits, cash on hand, 
bank deposits, accounts receivable and proceeds and products 
thereof, records pertaining to accounts receivable, causes of 
action, licenses, miscellaneous personal property, goodwill 
and general intangibles, with respect to the Rehab Facilities 
and the Park City Facilities, including, without limitation, the 
property and items described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto 
(collectively, the "Personal Property and Accounts."). 
The other documents which comprise the transaction are likewise all inclusive. If 
anything had been retained, it should have been listed as such. It was not. 
Therefore, the lower court's analysis in this case must fail as a matter of law as it is 
a too restrictive and narrow interpretation of the facts and circumstances of this case. 
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Instead, looking at this case in its entirety, it is clear that, at the time the parties entered 
into the Termination Agreement in 1989, the Appellees recognized that Rehabilitation 
had contributed something of value to the reputation of the ongoing business known as 
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". Otherwise, Appellees, who drafted the Termination 
Agreement, would not have included paragraph 11 and the clause over which the parties' 
are currently arguing. Paragraph 11 makes it clear that the Appellees recognized that 
both the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" and the 3900 South location had 
acquired goodwill as that term is defined above and that Rehabilitation, as physical 
therapists providing services in conjunction with the medical services provided by 
Appellees, contributed to that good will. In other words, the Center had acquired a 
reputation as a full service sports medicine center where an injured party could have all of 
his/her needs met in the medical and therapeutic treatment of sports injuries. Looking at 
the May, 1990 transaction, wherein Appellees sold the "Center" and given the significant 
disparity between the ultimate purchase price for the "Center" and the negligible value of 
tangible assets, it is this reputation, evidenced by the name, that was the primary asset 
sold by Appellees in the May 1990 transaction. 
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Looking at it another way, if, as the Appellees are now arguing, the only good will 
in this entire matter is attributable to the independent reputations of the individual 
surgeons, then paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement is meaningless. It is of 
course, a very basic tenet of contract law that the court must avoid an interpretation of a 
contract which renders it meaningless. This is especially true where the drafter of the 
contract is the party who is propounding the interpretation which renders its own contract 
meaningless. If Rehabilitation had made absolutely no contribution to the good will at 
issue, why did Appellees present them with and why did the parties sign a contract which 
grants Rehabilitation an interest in an asset with significant monetary value? Clearly, 
Appellees' current position is in stark contrast to their position and their conduct in 1989. 
Instead, looking at the circumstances of this matter as a whole, the parties had been 
in business together offering medical and therapeutic services for the treatment of sports 
injuries for several years. In 1989, they went their separate ways, subject to each parties' 
rights and obligations pursuant to the terms of the Termination Agreement. Among the 
obligations imposed upon Appellees by the Agreement was the obligation to pay a 
portion of the proceeds of a future sale of the Center if the sale occurred within two years. 
It did. In May of 1990, the Appellees sold the Center, for a significant amount of money 
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over and above the value of tangible assets. The sale expressly included the sale of "good 
will", without on the one hand, listing the sale of the name, and on the other hand, without 
defining "good will" as limited to the reputations of the individual Appellees or expressly 
excluding the name from the sale. Thereafter, the Center continued to operate at the same 
location and under the same name for at least four and as many as eighteen months after 
the sale. As a result, the joint venture which purchased the Center received the benefit 
from the public recognition of the name, "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". Based on 
this scenario, Rehabilitation is clearly entitled to an award of one-third of the purchase 
price attributable to good will. 
At the very least, the court committed its second error in granting summary 
judgment in the face of genuine issues of material fact. This is especially true where the 
court has an obligation to review the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. The only evidence in the Appellees' favor is the omission of the name from the 
documents (which is legally insufficient) and the unsupported, clearly self serving 
affidavit of Lonnie Paulos, an individual Appellee, that the name was not sold. In 
contrast are the affidavits of Gene Oaks, business manager for the Center and a witness 
for Appellees, that the joint venture continued to use the name for at least four months 
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after the sale, and the affidavits of two people not a party to this action, Gene Mayer, a 
licensed physical therapist who worked with Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg at all times 
pertinent to this dispute, and Jamie Beers, an ex-ray technician at the 3900 South Center 
(see addendum "F"). Both have testified that the name of the Center was changed only 
after this lawsuit was filed. If this is the case, the joint venture buyer used the name for 
over eighteen months after the sale in May of 1990. Appellants would submit that the 
right to use a name and the use of the name, for whatever period of time, and even the 
right to stop using the name, are strong indicia of ownership. The only argument which 
Appellees could possibly use to counter this evidence is to argue that the use of the name 
was incidental and meaningless. This argument once again runs afoul of the clear 
purpose of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. At the time they drafted the 
Agreement and presented it to Rehabilitation to sign, Appellees' had to have believed that 
the name had value as they made its sale and continued use at the same location a 
condition of the pay out which Rehabilitation seeks in this action. 
One more point must be made. At no time prior to the motion for summary 
judgment at issue on appeal have Appellees taken the position that something was not 
sold. First, they argued that they sold only a one-half interest in everything. This court 
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rejected that argument, holding that the transfer to the joint venture was a sale of 
Appellees' entire interest. Faced now with the only issue being the continued use of the 
name at the same location (which Appellees' own evidence establishes) they now argue 
that an entire asset was not sold at all. Not only does this late effort to create a new issue 
lack all credibility, the Appellees should not have been allowed by the lower court to 
make arguments which clearly exceed the well-defined scope of this court's instructions 
on remand. The Order Granting Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment must be 
vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement meaning as required by law, 
and assessing the totality of the facts and circumstances of this matter from 1989 to the 
present, it is clear that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment. It allowed 
Appellees to raise an issue well beyond the scope of remand. Then, in resolving that 
issue, the court's reliance on the omission of the name from the list of assets sold as the 
primary basis for the summary judgment is an error as a matter of law. When a business 
is sold, there is a presumption that good will has likewise been sold, and when good will 
is sold, there is a presumption that the name is sold. Even if the court could overcome 
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these legal principles, the facts and circumstances as outlined herein create, at the very 
least, a genuine dispute of material facts. Thus, the court erred in granting summary 
judgment. 
This court should vacate the order granting summary judgment; it should enter its 
own order declaring that all terms and provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement have been satisfied as a matter of law; and it should remand this matter for the 
sole determination of the amount of the purchase price attributable to the purchase of 
goodwill. 
DATED this day of January, 1998. 
GREEN & LJUHN, P.C. 
tiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 1999,1 caused to be hand 
delivered, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Robert S. Campbell 
CAMPBELL MOXLEY & CAMPBELL 
Broadway Center, Suite 880 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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• - ree e t te  t is ' /  f /^/ ^ \ / • 
1989, between Salt Lake Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. 
I (hereinafter referred to as "Rehabilitation"), and Salt Lake 
City Knee k Sports Medicine (hereinafter referred to as 
"Physicians"). 
WHEREAS Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
(hereinafter referred to as •Medicine") and Rehabilitation 
entered into a Professional Services Contract and Lease 
Agreement dated September 23, 1987 (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Agreement"); and 
WHEREAS Medicine gave to Rehabilitation a Notice 
of Termination dated January 19, 198 9 pursuant to the terms 
of the Agreement; and 
WHEREAS Physicians is the successor in interest to 
Medicine; and 
WHEREAS Rehabilitation desires to s e l l to 
Physicians and Physicians desire to purchase from 
Rehabilitation certain equipment owned by Rehabilitation and 
currently located at the office of Rehabilitation at 670 
East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Now, therefore, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants set forth below, the parties hereto agree as 
follows: 
I ; DEPOSITION I 
I 4 CVUIDIT I 
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1. Termination. The Agreement i s hereby 
terminated e f f e c t i v e April 19, 198 9, subject to the 
provis ions of paragraph 13 of that Agreement which by i t s 
terms survives the termination of the Agreement. 
2. Vacation of Premises. Rehabi l i tat ion sha l l 
vacate the premises at 670 East 3 900 Southf Sa l t Lake City, 
Utah, (hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises") 
which i s the subject of the Agreement, no l a t e r than Sunday, 
April 23 , 1989 at 12:00 Midnight. 
3. Release of Claims. The part ies hereto hereby 
re l ease each other and their predecessors in in t ere s t and 
pr inc ipals for a l l claims and l i a b i l i t y to each other 
ar i s ing out of the Agreement or the p a r t i e s ' performance 
thereunder/ except for any claims aris ing out of paragraph 
11 and paragraph 13 of the Agreement, which claims are 
s p e c i f i c a l l y reserved by the part ies . 
4. Sale of Equipment. Rehabil i tat ion hereby 
s e l l s to Physicians and Physicians hereby purchase from 
Rehabil i tat ion that equipment owned by Rehabi l i tat ion and 
currently located at the "Leased Premises" which i s set 
forth in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Equipment"). 
5. Purchase Price. The purchase price for the 
Equipment shall be Thirty-Three Thousand Nine Hundred and 
Twenty-Nine Dollars ($33,929.00) and s h a l l be paid to 
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Rehahil i tat ion by Physicians in cash at the time of Closing, 
subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 below. 
6. Payment of Costs in Connection with Granite 
School Dis tr ic t High School Sports Medicine program. In 
addition to the purchase price for the Equipment, Physicians 
s h a l l pay to Rehabil itation at Closing, subject to the 
provis ions of paragraph 7 below, the sum of Six Thousand 
Dollars ($6,000.00), which represents reimbursement to 
Rehabil itation for costs incurred by Rehabil itation in 
connection with Rehabi l i tat ion's part ic ipation in Medicine's 
Granite School D i s tr i c t High School Sports Medicine Program. 
1.- Liens and Encumbrances, It i s understood by 
the part ies that the Equipment i s encumbered by a securi ty 
i n t e r e s t held by West One Bank (as successor in in teres t of 
Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company) to secure payment of a 
current balance owing of Forty-One Thousand Three Hundred 
Eighty-One and 37/100 do l lars ($41,381.37) . In addit ion, i t 
i s understood that the Equipment, as well as certain 
equipment previously sold by Rehabil i tat ion to Physicians 
(in approximately September of 198 7) i s encumbered by a 
secur i ty interest held by Capital City Bank (as successor in 
i n t e r e s t of Union Bank)* Rehabilitation shall insure that 
those encumbrances are cleared and released in connection 
with the purchase hereunder. In that regard, i t i s 
understood that at Closing the payments to be made to 
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Rehabilitation shall be paid jointly to Rehabilitation and 
West One Bank. Rehabilitation shall then use those funds 
together with such of its own funds as necessary to 
immediately pay off the amount owing to West One Bank and 
procure and have filed a termination of West One's security 
interest against the Equipment. It is anticipated that the 
parties will together proceed directly from the Leased 
Premises to the West One Bank on the day of Closing to make 
certain that the above-described procedure is accomplished. 
8. Closing. Closing shall occur at the Leased. 
Premises at a time mutually agreeable to the parties, but in 
no event later than Friday, May 5, 1989 at 5:00 p.m. At 
closingf Physicians or their representative shall take a 
physical inventory of the Equipment. At closing, 
Rehabilitation shall provide to Physicians written 
verification from Capital City Bank (as successor in 
interest to Union Bank) that any liens or security interests 
that entity may have against the Equipment and against any. 
equipment Physicians or its partners may have previously 
purchased from Rehabilitation (including without limitation 
the physical therapy equipment located at 3 59 8th Avenue 
which was purchased in approximately September of 198 7) have 
been terminated. Upon verification of the presence of each 
item of Equipment, and upon receipt of the verification 
required above, physicians shall deliver to Rehabilitation a 
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check made payable to Rehabilitation and West One Bank for 
the entire purchase price of the Equipment together with the 
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above, 
9. Warranties. Rehabilitation warrants that it 
owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances 
except those referred to in paragraph 7 above, and has the 
right to sell the same. Rehabilitation further warrants 
that all of the Equipment shall at the time of Closing be in 
good working condition and free from defects. 
10• Coin Toss Regarding Murray High School» 
Physicians and Rehabilitation acknowledge' that pursuant to 
paragraph 13 of the Agreement, the right to be involved in a 
Sports Medicine program at high schools which became a part 
of Medicine1s High School Sports Medicine Program after the 
effective date of the Agreement would be determined by a 
toss of the coin. The parties agree that Murray High School 
fits into that category, and the parties therefore agree 
that at Closing a coin toss shall be conducted between 
Physicians and Rehabilitation, with the winner of that coin 
toss having the sole right to conduct a Sports Medicine 
Program at Murray High School, free from competition from 
the loser of that coin toss. 
11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this Agreement, 
Physicians sells the Center to any third party. 
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Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is attributed to good-
will. "Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein the 
purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: The Centerfs lease on the Leased Premises, 
ownership of the name "Sale Lake Sports Medicine Center,* 
all of the equipment and other assets located at the Center, 
the Center's patients and accounts receivable, and whereby 
the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the 
business of the Center and continues operating under the 
same name at the same location. 
12. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be 
binding on and inure to the benefit of the parties, and 
their heirs, successors, and assigns. 
13. Time. Time is of the essence of this 
Agreement. 
14. Attorneys Fees. Should any party default in 
or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained 
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay all 
costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, 
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which nay accrue from enforcing t h i s Agreement, or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder, or by a p p l i c a b l e 
law. 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC. 
I t s s£ -^Sss^TZ* c^r 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah Par tnersh ip 
By LONNIE E. PAULOS^ M.D. .Inc . 
a P r o f e s s i o n a l / C o r p o r a t i o n , 
General 
By THOMAS.D. RDSEN2ERG, M.D., p.C. 
a Professional Corporation, 
• General Partner 
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Mark 0. Morris and Jeffrey T. Sivertsen, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before DAVIS, BENCH and BILLINGS, 
JJ. 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Re-
habilitation, Inc. (Rehabilitation) challenges 
the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment to appellees, Salt Lake City Knee 
& Sports Medicine (Physicians), a general 
partnership; and its general partners, Lon-
nie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah profession-
al corporation (Paulos); and Thomas D. 
Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation (Rosenberg).' We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS 
Rehabilitation and Physicians formerly 
worked together providing medical and phys-
ical therapy services at the Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center (Center) located at 670 East 
3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, under the 
terms of a professional services agreement 
On May 22,1989, these parties entered into a 
termination agreement and purchase agree-
ment (Agreement) which terminated the par-
ties' professional services contract. Para-
graph eleven of this Agreement stated: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this 
Agreement, Physicians sells the Center to 
any third party, Rehabilitation shall be 
entitled to one-third (%) of that portion of 
the purchase price which is attributed to 
tfood will. 'Sale' shall be defined as a 
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires 
and pays consideration for all of the follow-
ing: The Center's lease on the Leased 
Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt 
Uke Sports Medicine Center/ all of the 
equipment and other assets located at the 
Center, the Center's patients and accounts 
receivable, and whereby the purchaser as-
sumes complete operational control of the 
business of the Center and continues oper-
ating under the same name at the same 
location. 
On May 24, 1990, Physicians entered into 
an asset purchase agreement with IHC Hos-
pitals (IHC) pursuant to which Physicians 
sold IHC an undivided one-half interest in 
the Center. Physicians and IHC then 
formed a joint venture called "Sports Medi-
cine West" and transferred their respective 
one-half interests thereto. 
The joint venture continued to do business 
at the Center's location and it temporarily 
retained Physicians as its agent to manage 
and operate the business. At some point in 
time, Sports Medicine West changed the 
Center's name from "Salt Lake Sports Medi-
cine Center" to "Sports Medicine West" 
The parties dispute precisely when Sports 
Medicine West changed the Center's name, 
however it is undisputed that the name was 
not changed until at least one year before the 
action in this case was filed, approximately 
October 1990. 
On October 4, 1991, Rehabilitation filed a 
complaint for declaratory relief, allegii)g that 
the transactions between IHC and Physi-
cians constituted a "sale" under paragraph 
eleven of the Agreement Physicians filed a 
motion for summary judgment on June 15, 
1993, and Rehabilitation filed a counter-mo-
tion for summary judgment shortly thereaf-
ter. 
After hearing oral argument on the mo-
tions, the trial court permitted further brief-
ing on the parties' interpretations of the 
meaning of "sale" as defined by the Agree-
ment On November 15, 1993, the court 
heard additional oral argument on the sub-
ject and ruled that to constitute a sale, the 
transaction "must include all of the following 
. . . items [from paragraph eleven]. And 
from those items, it must . . . [include] all of 
the equipment and assets, and they [the pur-
chaser] must have complete operational con-
trol." The court ruled that the transfer of 
one-half of the intoroof ;~ +u~ ^-~* < ~-~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was not a sale and rejected Rehabilitation's 
argument that the transfer of all assets to 
the joint venture was a "sale." Therefore, 
the court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of Physicians on November 15, 1993. 
Rehabilitation filed a "motion for reconsid-
eration" of the trial court's ruling on Novem-
ber 29, 1993. The trial court heard the 
motion on January 28, 1994, and again ruled 
in favor of Physicians. An order to this 
effect was entered on March 14, 1994. On 
April 11, 1994, Rehabilitation filed this ap-
peal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1,2] There are essentially two issues 
presented on appeal. The first issue con-
. cerns the timeliness of Rehabilitation's ap-
peal. "[I]t is axiomatic in this jurisdiction 
that failure to timely perfect an appeal is a 
jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of 
the appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 
1984). The second issue presented is wheth-
er the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment to Physicians based upon its con-
clusion that the transaction between IHC 
and Physicians was not a "sale" within the 
meaning of paragraph eleven of the Agree-
ment. Summary judgment is appropriate in 
a case where the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with any affidavits, show there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Warbur-
ton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App.1995). In 
determining the propriety of a grant of sum-
mary judgment, we view the facts in the light 
most favorable to the position of the losing 
party. Warburtxm, 899 P.2d at 781. We 
review the trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Timeliness of the Appeal 
[3] Physicians argues that Rehabilita-
tion's motion for reconsideration did not toll 
1. We have considered Physicians's other argu-
ments on this issue, including the contentions 
that Rehabilitation simply filed a motion for clar-
ification and that there is some significance to be 
attached to the timing of the entry of the sum-
the running of the time in which to appeal, 
and hence Rehabilitation's appeal was un-
timely.1 It is by now well established that 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
provide for a "motion for reconsideration" of 
a trial court's ruling. Ron Shepherd Ins^ 
Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (Utah 
1994); accord Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa <fe 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061,1064 (Utah 1991). None-
theless, we have "reviewed motions so enti-
tied if they could have properly been brought 
under some rule and were merely incorrectly 
titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653 n. 4; see 
also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 
P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App.1994) (noting 
that "the substance, not caption, of a motion 
is dispositive in determining the character of 
the motion"). 
[4] In this case, Rehabilitation captioned 
its motion as a motion for reconsideration. 
However, our review indicates that the sub-
stance of the motion was essentially identical 
to a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifi-
cally, Rehabilitation argued that the trial 
court made several errors of law which are 
grounds for relief under Rule 59(a)(7). In 
addition, by conducting a hearing and reaf-
firming its legal conclusions, the trial court 
ruled upon the motion as if it were a motion 
for a new trial. Therefore, as iiy Watkiss & 
Campbell, 
[u]nder the facts of this case, the incorrect j£: 
title placed upon the pleading was not a 
bar to defendant's case. Indeed, the re<s' 
ord reflects that the judge ruled on the J|: 
motion as if it were a motion for a new :* 
trial. Because the court treated the mo- ^ 
tion to reconsider as a motion for a new 
trial, we conclude that the filing of the -
motion tolled the time in which to file an 
appeal. 
Id. at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted). 
We conclude that Rehabilitation's motion Jj : 
to reconsider is substantively a motion for a ; | | 
mary judgment order, and reject them as being |p£ 
without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291,\g| 
303 (Utah 1992); State v. Carter, lit P.2d 8 8 6 , ^ 
888-89 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, — U.S. %"M 
116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995). - 1 | Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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new trial, and as such it tolled the time for 
filing an appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was 
thus timely.2 
2. Summary Judgment 
The trial court granted Physicians's motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that a 
"sale" to a "third" party within the meaning 
of paragraph eleven of the Agreement had 
not occurred. The court stated it was 44un-
persuaded" by Rehabilitation's argument 
that all of the assets were transferred to the 
new joint venture, Sports Medicine West 
Thus, the only transfer considered by the 
court was the transfer of one-half of the 
interest in the Center to IHC. Because a 
transfer of less than "all" of the interest in 
the Center does not trigger the "sale" defini-
tion in paragraph eleven, the court granted 
summary judgment to Physicians. 
The trial court's rationale for rejecting Re-
habilitation's argument that all of the assets 
were transferred to the joint venture, Sports 
Medicine West, is unclear. Physicians 
claims, however, that because it is a co-owner 
of Sports Medicine West, the joint venture 
cannot be a <4third party" within the meaning 
of paragraph eleven. We disagree. 
[5] A joint venture is defined as "an asso-
ciation of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a single business enterprise." 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1(1) (1994). Joint 
ventures are subject to the same rules as 
partnerships. Id. § 4&-1-3.K2); Kemp v. 
Murray, 680 P^d 758, 759 n. 1 (Utah 1984); 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App. 
1990). Based upon the statutes governing 
partnerships, the Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled that partnerships are distinct and sepa-
rate legal entities. See Cottonwood MoU Co. 
v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1988) (noting 
several sections of the Uniform Partnership 
Act treating partnership as a separate legal 
entity); Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Dis-
2. Notwithstanding our conclusion, we are not 
approving the use of pleadings identified as 
something not provided for in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Such a practice could seriously 
compromise the position of a litigant where a 
"motion for reconsideration," for example, was 
not substantively a motion enumerated under 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, or where other litigants or third parties 
acted or failed to act in reliance only on the 
trib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979) 
(noting partnership is legal entity distinct 
from partners). Because these statutes ap-
ply equally to joint ventures, it follows that 
joint ventures are also distinct and separate 
legal entities. See Sine, 767 P.2d at 501 
(concluding that joint ventures have capacity 
to sue in their own names, relying on author-
ity treating partnerships as distinct entities). 
[6] We therefore conclude that, under 
Utah law, joint ventures are separate legal 
entities. Our conclusion is consistent with 
rulings in several other jurisdictions. See 
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Kandik 
Canstr., Inc., 795 P.2d 793, 802 (Alaska 1990) 
(inferentially holding that joint venture is a 
separate legal entity), vacated in part on 
other grounds, 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991); 
First State Serv. Corp. v. Hector's Concrete 
Canstr., Inc., 168 Ariz. 442, 814 P.2d 783, 783 
(App.1991) (joint venture is a separate legal 
entity); C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 
450 P.2d 211, 214 (Okla.1968) (same); Lawler 
v. Dallas Statler-Hitton Joint Venture, 793 
S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex.CtApp.1990) (same).3 
But see Lewis v. Gardner Eng'g Corp., 254 
Ark. 17, 491 S.W2d 778, 779 (1973) (joint 
venture not a separate legal entity); Elting 
Ctr. Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306 
So.2d 542, 543 (Fla.DistCtApp.1974) (same), 
cert denied, 321 So.2d 554 (Fla.1975). As a 
separate legal entity, Sports Medicine West 
is a "third party" within the meaning of 
paragraph eleven. 
[7] In addition, Physicians was paid by 
IHC for an undivided one-half interest in its 
assets, and it received a one-half interest in 
the joint venture for the other one-half of the 
assets. Therefore, the paragraph eleven re-
quirement that consideration be paid for the 
assets was also satisfied. Sports Medicine 
West also has complete operational control of 
the Center as evidenced by the terms of the 
name of the pleading possibly obtained from a 
docket entry. 
3. Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Part-
nership Act, but also considers joint ventures to 
be separate legal entities. West Feliciana Parish 
Sch. Bd. v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 486 So.2d 808, 
811 (La.Ct.App.1986). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
270 Utah 909 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Management Agreement stating that Sports 
Medicine West had complete "day-to day" 
operational control of the rehabilitation busi-
ness. 
Finally, according to the parties, the only 
remaining issue is whether the joint venture 
continued operating the business under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." 
The trial court did not reach this issue,4 
notwithstanding disputed, material facts, 
having resolved the matter on the issue of 
sale of assets. Because of the existence of 
disputed material facts, the issue of whether 
the joint venture continued to operate the 
business under the same name is remanded 
to the trial court for determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The joint venture Sports Medicine West is 
a distinct and separate legal entity from Phy-
sicians, and from Paulos and Rosenberg, the 
general partners of Physicians. As such, it is 
a "third person" within the meaning of para-
graph eleven. In addition, consideration was 
paid for the assets and Sports Medicine West 
assumed full operational control of the Cen-
ter. Thus, we reverse the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment to Physicians based 
upon the finding that only one-half of the 
assets were transferred to IHC. It appears 
that material issues of fact exist regarding 
the question of whether Sports Medicine 
West continued to operate the Center under 
the same name. We therefore remand the 
matter for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring and 
dissenting): 
I concur in holding that this appeal was 
timely filed. I dissent, however, from the 
reversal of the summary judgment. 
As to the timeliness of the appeal, I agree 
that Rehabilitation's "motion for reconsidera-
tion" was essentially a Rule 59 motion for a 
new trial. See State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 
4. The trial court also did not reach the subsidiary 
issue of whether to strike the affidavits submitted 
by Rehabilitation. We note however, that even if 
the trial court had struck Rehabilitation's affida-
1041, 1044 (Utah App.) (holding substance of 
post-judgment motion controls, not caption), 
cert denied 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). We 
have previously held that a motion for a new 
trial may properly be filed following entry of 
a summary judgment Moon Lake Eke. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. UUrasystems W. Con&trs., /no, 
767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App.1988). Our 
rules explicitly provide that "the time for 
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial" Utah 
R.App.P. 4(b). The filing of a motion under 
Rule 59 therefore tolls the time for filing a 
notice of appeal. 
On the merits, I disagree with the main 
opinion's analysis and result The contract 
between the parties provides that Physicians 
will share the sale proceeds attributable to 
"good will" only when Physicians sell the 
entire Center to a third party. In the trans-
action involving IHC, Physicians clearly re-
tained an ownership interest in the Center. 
The fact that the Center is now operated 
as a joint venture does not lead to the result 
reached by the main opinion. The joint ven-
ture statute provides that the only way Phy-
sicians can participate in a joint venture is if 
it is a co-owner. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-
1-3.1(1) (1995) ("[a] joint venture is an associ-
ation of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a single business enterprise.") 
(emphasis added). Since Physicians indis-
putably remains a co-owner of the Center, it 
has not sold it as contemplated by paragraph 
eleven of the parties, agreement 
I would therefore affirm the summary 
judgment 




wits, the affidavit submitted by Physicians estab-
lishes nonetheless that the name of the business 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation, general partners, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910906316 CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Defendants Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. 
Paulos, M.D., P.C., and Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C. 
respectfully move the Court for its order dismissing the above 
captioned complaint for the reason that there are no material 
disputed facts and summary judgment is proper as a matter of law. 
This motion is based on the following grounds: 
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1. This case involves the interpretation of a contract, 
which is a legal issue preserved for the court. 
2. Plaintiff's claim for recovery is based on flll of the 
Termination Agreement between the parties dated May 22, 1989. 
3. Pursuant to that contract provision, plaintiff is 
entitled to a recovery only if the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center" was sold, and if some portion of the purchase paid for the 
Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center assets is attributed to goodwill. 
4. The evidence is undisputed that the name "Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center" was not sold by IHC or any third party. 
5. The evidence is also undisputed that no portion of the 
purchase price paid by IHC to acquire certain assets of Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center were attributable to goodwill. 
6. Because there are no factual disputes, and the 
interpretation and construction of the subject contract is a 
matter of law, summary judgment on this case is appropriate as a 
matter of law. 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities filed concurrently herewith, summary 
judgment dismissing complaint should be granted as a matter of 
law. 
DATED t h : Lis /&*£ d a Y o f NQ¥nm^ry lL997 . 
Rjciy^ 
ROBERT S. CAMPB 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSO 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
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John C. Green, Esq. 
Kim M. Luhn, Esq. 
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that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon: 
John C. Green, Esq. 
Kim M. Luhn, Esq. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
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DATED this day of December, 1997. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D., P.C , a Utah 
professional corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D., 
P.C, a Utah professional 
corporation, general partners, 
Defendants. 
Defendants, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine Center, 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C, and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C 
(the "Defendants") , respectfully submit this Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910906316 CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On or about May 22, 1989, Plaintiff and Defendant Salt 
Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine entered into a Termination 
Agreement and Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") which, 
'among other things, terminated a Professional Services Contract 
and Lease Agreement entered into on or about September 23, 1987 
between Plaintiff and Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center. Complaint 
56; Amended Answer 57. A true and correct copy of the Termination 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" the terms of which are 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement provides in 
[pertinent part as follows: 
11. Purchase of Center. It is agreed that 
if within two (2) years from the date of this 
Agreement, Physicians [Defendant, Salt Knee & 
Sports Medicine] sells the Center [Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center] to any third party, 
Rehabilitation [Plaintiff Salt Lake Knee and 
Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.] shall be 
entitled to one-third (1/3) of that portion 
of the purchase price which is attributable 
to good will. "Sale" shall be defined as a 
j transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and 
pays consideration for all of the following: 
the Center's lease on the leased premises, 
ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center," all of the equipment and 
other assets located at the Center, and the 
Center's patients and accounts receivable, 
and whereby the purchaser assumes complete 
operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
3. On or about May 24, 1990, defendant Salt Lake City Knee 
and Sports Medicine entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with 
ii 
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IHC Hospitals, Inc. (the "IHC Agreement"). Complaint, f8; 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at flO, ATTACHED HERETO AS Exhibit "B". 
4. Pursuant to the IHC Agreement, Salt Lake City Knee and 
Sports Medicine sold to IHC a one-half interest in the medical 
practices it owned and operated at its clinics at Eighth Avenue in 
Salt Lake City; at 3900 South, and also at Park City, together 
with certain related assets. The other one-half interest was 
conveyed to a joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee 
and Sports Medicine Center, known as Sports Medicine West. 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at flO. 
5. Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg had a very small practice at 
3900 South. It was a fraction of their 8th Avenue practice. In 
connection with the sale to IHC, a one-half (1/2) interest in 
certain equipment of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was sold 
to IHC. However, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center11 was 
not among the assets sold to IHC or conveyed to Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center. Dr. Paulos Affidavit at HflO and 11. 
6. IHC did not seek to acquire the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center"; it did not pay any consideration for the 
acquisition thereof; and it did not purchase or acquire that 
name, or any interest therein. Further, Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center and Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center did not sell 
to IHC or convey to the Sports Medicine West any interest in the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 
511; Deposition of Greg Gardner at 41-44, attached hereto as 
iii 
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Exhibit "C".; Deposition of Douglas Toole at 85, attached hereto 
as Exhibit "D". 
| 7. No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire 
assets of the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center were attributed to 
the good will. Dr. Paulos Affidavit at 115, attached here as 
Exhibit "B". 
8. IHC paid $662,225.00 to acquire a one-half interest in 
the clinics and practices owned and operated by Dr. Lonnie Paulos 
and Dr. Thomas Rosenberg, and their entities on Eighth Avenue and 
in Park City and certain assets of Salt Lake City Knee and the 
Salt Lake Sports Medicine and the Sports Medicine Center which 
operated at 3900 South and in consideration of the non-competition 
agreement signed by Drs. Paulos and Rosenberg, the multiples paid 
by IHC was for the non-competition agreement. Dr. Paulos 
Affidavit at 512-15, attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
9. When the lease with Salt Lake Knee and Sports 
Rehabilitation, Inc. at 3900 South was terminated on May 22, 1989 
Gregory Gardner, Douglas Toole and their entity Salt Lake Knee and 
iSports Rehabilitation, Inc., took their patients and relocated 
their practice, continuing their rehabilitation practice. 
Deposition of Gregory Gardner at 39-40, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C". 
10. On or about October 9, 1991 the Plaintiff Salt Lake 
Sports Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, an entity owned by Gregory 
Gardner and Douglas Toole, filed an action against the Defendants 
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Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and Dr. Lonnie Paulos, M.D., 
p.C. and Thomas Rosenberg, M.D., P.C. to recover one-third of the 
good will attributable to the sale certain of assets of the Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center to IHC. 
11. On or about June 15, 1993, Defendants filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the basis that no sale of all of the 
assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center was made to a third 
party that assumed complete operational control of the business of 
the Center. 
12. This Court granted summary judgment by Order dated 
December 6, 1993. 
13. By Order dated March 14, 1994, this Court granted 
Reconsideration and affirmed Summary Judgment. 
14. Plaintiffs appealed this Court's decision to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. By Opinion filed December 21, 1995, the Court 
of Appeals reversed summary judgment on a narrow basis. It held 
that the sale of certain assets by Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center was a sale to a "third party" within the meaning of 
paragraph 11. Court of Appeals Slip Opinion at 5. 
15. The Appellate Court's rationale was that one-half of the 
interest was sold to IHC, a third party, and Salt Lake Knee and 
Sports Medicine transferred the other half to a joint venture 
known as Sports Medicine West, which the Appellate Court 
determined was a separate legal entity. Consequently, it 
determined the sale was to a third party. Id. 
v 
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16. The issue of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center" was ever sold by Defendants to IHC or Sports Medicine West 
jwas not raised by the prior summary judgment motion nor was it an 
issue before the Court of Appeals, and consequently was not 
decided by the Court of Appeals. 
17. The Court of Appeals also did not determine whether the 
"joint venture between IHC and Salt Lake City Knee and Sports 
Medicine continued operating the business under the name "Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center." 
18. Neither did the Appellate Court consider or determine 
what, if any, portion of the purchase price paid for the certain 
of the assets of the Center were attributable to good will. 
ARGUMENT 
This case can and should be disposed of by summary judgment, 
as a matter of law for two unavoidable reasons, not previously 
raised in this case nor considered or disposed of by the Court of 
Appeals: 
1. The provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement are triggered only if the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" were sold to a third party. But that name was 
not sold to IHC, Sports Medicine West, or any other third party. 
Consequently, there is no liability. 
2. No portion of the purchase price paid by IHC to acquire 
certain assets from Salt Lake City Knee and Sports Medicine Center 
were attributed to good will. Because no consideration was paid 
1 
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to acquire good will, plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery. 
As set forth below, the interpretation of these contract 
provisions is strictly a legal question properly resolved by 
summary judgment. Moreover, discovery is now concluded, and there 
are no disputed facts affecting these issues. Consequently, 
summary judgment should be entered as a matter of law. 
I 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED ARE LEGAL ISSUES PROPERTY RESOLVED BY 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This Court should grant summary judgment when the record 
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Indeed the Utah Supreme Court has declared 
that summary judgment shall be rendered under these circumstances: 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, summary judgment shall be rendered 
if the record demonstrates that "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Webster v. Sillr 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). 
Suummary judgment serves a salutary purpose in promoting 
judicial efficiency and avoiding unnecessary trials by permitting 
the parties to pierce the pleadings and determine whether there 
are genuine issues to present to the fact finder. 
A major purpose of summary judgment is to 
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue to present 
2 
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to the fact finder. In accordance with this 
purpose, specific facts are required to show 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. 
The allegations of a pleading or factual 
conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient 
to raise a genuine issue of fact. 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgrenr 692 P.2d 776, 779 
(Utah 1984); Webster v. SillP 675 P.2d at 1172 (Utah 1983)(a major 
of purpose of summary judgment is to allow the pierce the 
pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact). 
Even, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
1247-48 (1986) (emphasis by Court) . Instead, summary judgment is 
mandated if "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion 
...party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to that parties case, on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
In moving for summary judgment, the movant need not 
affirmatively demonstrate the absence of elements critical to the 
Plaintiff's case. Instead, the non-moving party has the burden 
to come forward with evidence demonstrating the elemental 
requirements of its case. 
[W]e do not think the Adickes language 
quoted above should be construed to mean 
that the burden on the party moving for 
summary judgment to produce evidence 
showing the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact, even with respect to 
an issue on which the non-moving party 
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bears the burden of proof. Instead, as 
we have explained, the burden on the 
moving party may be discharged by 
"showing" — that is, pointing out to the 
District Court — that there is an 
absence of evidence to support the non-
moving partyfs case. 
Id. at 325 (emphasis added). 
j There are no disputed issues of fact on either of the grounds 
on which this summary judgment motion is based. The issues 
presented are contract issues. The contract language is clear and 
unambiguous and speaks for itself. Consequently, it is construed 
as a matter of law. Morris v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.f 
658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983): 
The interpretation of a contract is a 
question of law, to be decided by the judge, 
. . . 
More importantly, our recent cases hold that 
even the resolution of contract ambiguities 
is a question of law for the court. 
I For that reason, summary judgment is a particularly 
appropriate and helpful tool in this contract litigation. Indeed, 
the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the use of summary 
judgment in contract cases. 
When the existence of a contract and the 
identity of its parties are not in issue and 
when the contract provisions are clear and 
complete, the meaning of the contract can 
appropriately be resolved by the court on 
summary judgment. 
Id. at 1201 (emphasis added). 
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II. 
THE NAME "SALT LAKE SPORTS MEDICINE CENTER" 
WAS NEVER SOLD TO IHC OR SPORTS MEDICINE WEST. 
Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement is the operative 
provision that determines and specifies under what circumstances 
plaintiff was entitled to any payment in the event Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center was sold to a third party. That provision 
provides in pertinent part: 
It is agreed that if within two (2) years 
from the date of this Agreement, [defendant 
Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine Center] 
sells the [Salt Lake Sports Medicine] Center 
to any third party, [plaintiff, Salt Lake 
Knee and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.] shall 
be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is 
attributable to good will. 
Paragraph 11 then defines the term "sale" as it is used in that 
paragraph. It specifies that a "sale" does not occur unless the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" is sold to the third party. 
"Sale" shall be defined as a transfer wherein 
the purchaser acquires and pays consideration 
for all of the following: . . . ownership of 
the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center," 
....[emphasis added] 
The fact that ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" was never sold to IHC or the joint venture, 
Sports Medicine West, is undisputed. Plaintiff, through one of 
its partners and principals, Douglas Toole, admitted in his 
deposition that he doesnft know whether the name Salt Lake City 
Sports Medicine Center was sold to IHC or Sports Medicine West. 
Toole Deposition at 85, attached as Exhibit "D11. Mr. Toole's 
II 4 
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business associate, and the President of Plaintiff, Salt Lake Knee 
and Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., Gregory Gardner, concedes the 
same fact. He testified in his deposition that Plaintiff is not 
entitled to any recovery unless the name "Salt Lake Sports 
JMedicine Center" is sold to a third party. He then admitted that 
he is not aware of any document or writing indicating the name 
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" was sold. G. Gardner 
Deposition at 41, attached as Exhibit "C." 
Q. And in order for this paragraph 11 [of 
the Termination Agreement] to be 
triggered, it is true, is it not, that 
your understanding that the name Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center had to be 
sold the third party and used by the 
third party after the sale? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, can you point to any document or 
writing in which you are aware that the 
name Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
was sold by Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center to IHC as part of the transaction 
that followed in May of 1990? 
A. No, I couldn't tell you that. 
G. Gardner Deposition at 41. 
Consequently, Plaintiff had no factual basis to dispute the issue 
of whether the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine" was sold. 
In striking contrast, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, a 
principal in Salt Lake Knee and Sports Medicine and a partner in 
Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center, eliminates all doubt on the 
issue. He testifies that the Defendant, Salt Lake City Knee and 
Sports Medicine, never sold the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
5 
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Center" or otherwise conveyed that name to IHC, Sports Medicine 
West, or any other third party: 
11. Neither the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center" nor any interest 
therein was sold or otherwise conveyed 
to IHC or any third party. 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 511. 
These facts are uncontested and discovery is now closed. By 
the express terms of the contract, plaintiff's entitlement to one-
third (1/3) of that portion of the purchase price which is 
attributable to good will arises only if the sale of the name 
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" occurred. Because that sale did 
Inot occur, plaintiffs have no right to any recovery. 
Consequently, the Court can and should determine as a matter of 
law that the provisions of paragraph 11 relied on by Plaintiff are 
not triggered. For that reason, summary judgment is mandated as 
a matter of law. 
III. 
NO PORTION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IS 
ATTRIBUTED TO GOODWILL. 
A second basis for summary judgment exists that was not 
previously raised or addressed by the Court of Appeals. Under the 
controlling language of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement, 
Plaintiff is entitled to a recovery only if some portion of the 
purchase price paid for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
assets is attributed to goodwill. Discovery is concluded and the 
record is now clear, and without dispute, that no portion of the 
6 
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purchase price for the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center assets was 
attributed to good will. 
The deposition testimony of Greg Gardner and Douglas Toole, 
the principals of plaintiff, demonstrates unequivocally that they 
have no personal knowledge or information that any portion of the 
purchase price paid by IHC to acquire assets of the Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center were attributed to good will. Toole 
Deposition at 88. Mr. Toole testified he doesn't know, and has no 
idea what portion of the purchase price was attributable to 
goodwill. 
Because the principal of the Plaintiff, has admitted he has 
no knowledge or information concerning whether any goodwill was 
allocated to the sale of assets of Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center, the testimony of Dr. Lonnie Paulos, the principal of the 
entity selling the assets, stands uncontroverted and undisputed. 
iDr. Paulos testifies and confirms that no portion of the purchase 
price received from IHC was attributed to goodwill. 
12. IHC did not identify or value any goodwill 
associated with any assets in which it 
acquired an interest from Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center, nor did it allocate any 
portion of the $662,225.00 purchase price to 
goodwill associated therewith. 
13. As part of the Asset Purchase Agreement 
with IHC, Dr. Rosenberg and I were required to 
sign a non-competition agreement pursuant to 
which we agreed that we would not compete with 
IHC or with the medical practices being 
purchased by IHC from us. 
14. I was principally involved in negotiating 
the Asset Purchase Agreement with IHC. It was 
7 
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my intent and understanding in negotiating and 
executing that agreement that any multiples 
paid by IHC to acquire an interest in 
practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I maintained 
at the aforesaid clinics, and any related 
assets, was in consideration for the patients 
and practices that Dr. Rosenberg and I 
maintained at the Eighth Avenue Clinic and the 
Park City Clinic and for the execution by us 
of the aforesaid non-competition agreement. 
15. No part of the purchase price paid by IHC 
to acquire an undivided one-half interest in 
the practices and clinics maintained and 
operated by Dr. Rosenberg and me were 
allocated to any goodwill involving the Salt 
Lake Sports Medicine Center. 
Affidavit of Dr. Paulos at 5512-15. 
It is undisputed: No portion of the purchase price was 
attributed to good will. Consequently, Plaintiff is not entitled 
to any recovery. It is that simple. Because there is no genuine 
dispute on any material issue of fact with respect to this issue, 
summary judgment can and should be entered as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, defendants respectfully 
jmove the Court for its Order granting summary judgment dismissing 
the above-captioned matter as a matter of law. 
DATED this •^paay of December, 1997. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL . ^ ^ g ^ ^ — L - ^ 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the 
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth 
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANTS7 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon: 
John C. Green, Esq. 
Kim M. Luhn, Esq. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by U. S. Mail, postage prepaid. 
DATED this^g< day of December, 1997. 
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JOHN C. GREEN 1242 
KIM M. LUHN 5105 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake"city, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF 
'RT •i. K 
I.T 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY. INC. 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership. LONNIE E. PAULOS. 
M.D.. P .C. a Utah professional 
corporation and THOMAS D. 
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The Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, respectful!} submits this Memorandum of 
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STATEMENT Oi' UNI JISPI I IIiI) I1 At" I S 
Ihi parties aiiicc I liiii! illu IILiinliiri" «< ii| hi In IIVDH1! 111 till1 .ii lion is governed by 
paraeranh 11 of the Termination Agreement and Purchase Agreement between the parties dated 
May 22, 1989, which states: 
,i ,-N a y u mai i ill: i o (2) years from the 
dau -' Physicians seiib .... Center to any third • 
pan\. all be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which i> attributed to good will. 
"Sale" -.hull be defined as a transier wherein the purchaser acquires 
---
 J
 nays consideration lor all of the following: The Center's lease 
on itie Leased Premises, ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center", all of the equipment and other assets located at 
the Center, the Center's patients and accounts receivable, and 
whereby the purchaser assumes complete operational control of the 
business of the Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location, 
• . u;-nv UJ mi i. . laiiuu/\gicciin.iit and Purchase Agreement is herwio atu^hej. i -A1 
and b> referen* >• : » n."ri he-vf It will be referred to hereafter as the "Termniativn 
\ereement".) 
However, after the decisions rendered by the Court, of Appeals in this matter, only two _ 
issues contained ii i paragrapi. * * 
continue operating under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" after its puivha^e J : die 
Center in May of 1990; 'and 2) if so, what portion of the purchase price paid by the joint venture 
is attnt t/iur.iv !. ...
 f wiv::.,K o: : • . . . . . . a v • *• 
Medicine West, used the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" after the sale and if a portion 
of the purchase price paid was attributable to the purchase o - • todwill, the Plaintiff is entitled to 
2 
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judgment for one-third of that portion of the pi irehase price au:v::;a^!e :o eood\\ ill ( A. copy of 
tlii : 1 1; iii itiff s ? lei i 101 ai idi u: 11 ii 1 Si ippoi t c if its •" •! : t i :/ -i 1 l o i I }i a-. • :.; .• ;• - ; ; v i e : i. ; attached hereto a s 
cxliibit "2" for reference to a more specific analysis of the issue:' .'emamme after the decisions by 
ihe O pi af Appeals X; A. a corollary issue, if Plaintiff prewviis. ?:ai::ii:Yis entitled to its costs 
<*"' . .- I . U H . U . ' *t. 
STAlTMEN'l u\ U1SPU I EDI \ a 
seekinc Summan TJemcm the Defendants •ent that, no where in 
the purchase and sale doiamcm 
the name, 'ball Lake Snori:- .uer.M Because ^ 
ed anions 'iie »sseis. Delcnaam- conclude thai ii cuuk; a\'e been sold T^ 
:vein with this issue is barred b\ the decision rendered h\ h WUlS . Willi 
wncliici LUC e continued to operate 
i^  .,amc name at the same local;";, i >we\e: barred Defendants* 
anaK'sis is overly simplistic and contrary to other in disputed facts. 
Ill PI iiniiff .iilniil ill M ill- mi do.,k, nut ipp • ir a. m ">>ei ^n any list generated 
pursuant to the transaction resulting in uie ownership "i me • m.: " * die joint venture 
t low e\'ei it is likewise undisputed that IIK n-im venture continued : \<\\vi the name Sail Lake 
i:^:css of briefina the first 
<ei o\ motions for summary judgi nent back ii i 1993. the I X n , , , v . T ... :d the affidu\ i- of Gene 
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Oaks dated August A'K l'^.> wherein Mr. Oaks, as vac I ic ienuam- f u l n e s s manager at all t imes 
niTiin Mit tn flip I prinnni'iiKiii Wrcr mrnt thr "ilr tn fliiir inint 'vn tun ,iinl tIK lilni|.' nt Ihr I inr 
i-ur:, stated. u[The ju::ii \ enture] changed the name on the door of the Center, the marquis in the 
lobby and two monument signs located on the building exterior at 39 th South and at 7 th East 
approsiiiiJlelv one u m belon/ lln PILiintilfs !|> n;| lilnl lllnni Lm'iiil mil <l h/lubei, "I1'11'1!1 " 
Therefore, by Defendants ' own account, the joint venture continued to use the name through 
October of 1990, approximately four months after the sale to the joint venture in Mav (A c^p v 
nl ilu; i laks allitlax u is adadi t 'd licicio as ex lnh i I anil is, eierence made a p a r t hereof.) 
j Whether or not the use of the name continued after this initial four month period is 
disputed. Submitted contemporaneously with this memorandum are the affidavit of Lloyd 
Mayer, a licensed pny; i^rup:^; A:K. >,.*:;._ i;\ itlri Di s ^ ai.v. . .ojiiv.Tg J ; ; . ; ; I ^ . : 
relationship ' ,u -'\iinuffwasterminavd. and the affidavit fJamieB.v" ar. / 
technician at the 3900 So. Center at the same time. As both tcsnh ihe signs were not chaneed at 
least one year prior to this lawsuit. I lie signs were changed as a. result ot this ia\v>u =. , here lore, 
Center" for approximately one and one-half years after the transfer to the joint venture (Copies 
oi ine ailidavits are attached hereto as exhibits "4" a nd ' '5 1" and are, b> reference made a part 
hei eof.) 
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, >e:ene.aut> aiso argue that as a matter of law no :-.>:-:ion of the purchase price 
1
 • ' - n \ v i l - ' 
"i^*.iti":-ia\ u of Defendant oiir:^ Aa :os ;h.a ;he difference L-:-\e • ie yu\ chase pri,.e and the 
.iue v»i the ;.I:ILI!' 'I^ assets was solely consideration ft );r non v-mpetitii >n agreements which 
il H : ai i il  Di R osenberg > vere allege> l b " reqi lit cd to sign I c > h a :i \ AT:: i ±\- • i . •; the fii st til i 1 * the 
Defendants have made this argument despite the fact that this lawsnii has been pending for over 
•
;x
' * cn*s While t u e non-compet : + : ^n c l a u s e are referred v :- *^  -• ' ' —*;:re Agreement , 
v.,;is--iic*ii v)i die Center ib cs iao i i sne j . in auuiu^n. me puicnu. ^ ..<. «_ ..... .Tiweeu i l i L anu 
Defendants all expressly list "goodwill" a- ai. . - e ! a iv ir::nsfc,*:v... " Aiie ihcre ma.}" be a 
• li: ;>|; i Hi : as to the p : i tioi 1 of the pi n c ; n itai •:• : '•: ^ao; iv ill tl lei e can be no 
dispute that at least some considerat ion was paid for it. (Copies .A :ae Asset Purchase 
Agreement the Warranty Bill of Sale and the loint Venture \g reemcni are hereto at tached as 
e \ I ..; : e; erence made a part hereo f,} 
5. fo establish the amount of the purchase price allocable io ihe purchase of goodwil l at 
nia!, the Plaintiff will call Kirk W. Bennett , a certified public accounuint and an at torney. 
! vpeeit ically it is Mr. Bennett. s opinion that, where a sale has acn iaii; taken place ai id a 
i purchaser has paid a sum certain, the best evidence of value ::. Ac ;v,:;v:hase price Any 
theoretical valuation is no longer necessary as a theoretical vair.ai..-n is done for the purpose of 
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determining what a hypothetical purchaser would, pay for the item purchased. Therefore, Mr 
subpoenaed from IHC and documents produced by the Defendants. Primarily, in addition to the 
contracts between Defendants and IHC and the Joint Venture Agreement, he reviewed a 
iliiuiiin nl i i ill I bill "I ili nl ml in in ul \h li.illb I'un Ini .1 ML11, III"' I "HI"" mil ,i mullipdyt |wtkt1 n. Inn III 
begins with a memo to Everett Goodwin from D.R. Gardner dated October 5, 1990. Attached to 
the latter are accounting documents generated by IHC with respect to the transaction with 
I VfciiiLtnii ilopn.i ml tfii'i.t/ IIUUUIIILT. . : ... > ;-oena and response documents are 
attached hereto as exhibit "9" and are, by reference made a part hereof.) 
Mr. Bennett has determined that the difference between the purchase price and the 
:. -aiiij 01 me idii^iciL a;->bct.. .>, :;*c value of the purchase price atti, ..table to goodwill. 
Specif].:,. *\:-\±L: >. —ice paid by IHC f< >r < ) ' nlf o f t he C e n t e r , $ 4 8 7 000 is the 
difference between the book, value of the tangible assets and :he purchase price. This number is 
then doubled because the entire 1. writer was transferred to the joint venture. I herefbre, the value 
• * '
 ;
- -lM"' > • lassified a s "general intangibles" on its books and records is $974 ,000. 
; s:;> 1;umber must be allocated between the 3900 So. Center and another facility on 8th Ave in 
which I Maintiff has no interest, while Mr. Bennett is not able to specifically allocate without 
ninnr infoinialinni In1 eslini.ilinii 111 lli.il Pl.miliff is entitled U\ fil(M K IK SO plus inlnir I l u lllin 
6 
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transcript of the deposition of Kirk W Ren;u ;; *\hick > an. .' . ^ exhibit-"10"at pages 
7 6 ; ; ' • >6 ) 
/. While the Defendants argue that iiothin * exnres .
 r^ vixes any of the 
consideration paid as attributable to "LIOIU! *- :v" '* - : Bern-,.; . -;v:iion that there is nothing 
olse \ ;ran^; '. * .,.; ... » "genera: ;nn.::c - . \fier reaching a figure for 
d i e \ \- • • . - j .
 e 
he. determine :! an} ^ther asset could be included in this ciassiifeaiion. I ie looked for 
^pec ; i^ms ^ u ' i as patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc. Finding none, he concluded that the 
ild be represented as an ii nam liblc is 'g< v i \ n ; " :• : vh :\ n lett deposition at 
8. With respect to the Defendants* new allegation that the diiVerence in the purchase 
I »i if :< : ai in: il  ill i e II: >c : 1 : 'ah ie of the tai lgible assets is consideratii in ; -ai- i >oU :i; • foi a not i-competitioi I 
agreement by Defendants, there is absolutely no indication in the hooks and records of 
Defendants or IHC that this is the case, Therefore, while Defendants rely on the 'feet that the 
i M n ) "; si MI !.ei al ii itangibles" dc es :i i :)!: expressb • inch id * tl i : tei n i ""; :v Hxiwil!" ill iey a:t e sti id :: ' > it'll i tl ie 
fact that it also does not expressly list a "non-competition agreenient"". ! urther. the Asset 
Purchase Agreement between II IC and Defendants does expressi} lis; "goodwill" and does not 
e 
assets, expressly" including goodwill, remains a valid measure oftiie value of goodwill. 
7 
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0. The non-competition provisions of the Joint Venture Agreement recite -no monetary 
consideration. Instead, pursuant to the terms of the Joint V enture Agreement, the consideration 
may well have been the fact that II IC also agreed to correspond^ • - ,. - • 
In addition, the non-competition provisions in the Joint Ven! are \i:reernent specifically state that 
they are necessary to "preserve" and "enhance" the value of the goodwill oi aic Center, This 
cl 2arl> establish^ ; - - , d 
pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. The non-competition could easily have increased the 
value of the investment in the joint venture, but this does not change the fact that the parties 
agreed . s 
enhancement. In addition, as Mr. Bennett pointed out in his deposition, any such non-
competition agreement would be reduced in its value because the agreement would in essence be 
ACUMEN! 
THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT THE RELIEF DEFENDANTS REQUEST, AND 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A V
 THE FS! TF OF THE PORTION OF PURCHASE PRICE ATTRTRTTTART F 
TO GOODWILL 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary 
judgment only if the "'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
that the moving part) is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
8 
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T h e Defendants cannot mee t this burden on any of the issues the}* have raised To begin 
' "ill i ill :ie Defei iciai its ai 21 le tl lat the :i ia.ii i ie S a l t I ake Spoi is ! It s; ii :ii n : ( \M ltei w as i lot pui el: lased 
by "the joint venture. First, this issue is barred by the decision of the Court of Appeals which has 
remanded solely to determine if the joint venture continued operating under the name "Salt I ake 
v •:: \iedicii;c ^ ... ' 
evidence which supports the Defendants* argument is a self-serving affidavit filed b\ Lonnie 
~
 :
 . i " :o this effee: F \ i d c n c e u h ' c h es tabl ishes to the com-,::- ' ":.e admiss ion by the 
- h. leiiu^nt^ . . i j ; :\w ;^aUv J . U . u \ ,
 t lLingc loi «; ica:.; lour moni:- - ".••..• i.'-ra \ e n t u r e 
•* * * * itei ial 
• • "ri:- dispute eu: - ne are aoi parties to this actio;; \\ . me:: :^::;:v. i ::,a; ;he name \va^ not 
changed until this lawsuit was filed, eighteen months after the transaction. Either way it is 
le i lan le 1 tad nc *ah te an: id that it 'as i it >t } u u < :hasi :c 1 1 1 le par ti ss tc this 
lawsuit recognized the value when they entered into the I erminaiion .Agreement at issue in this 
matter and made continued use of the n a m e an element required to trigger payout under 
r 
mon ths and possibly as long as e ighteen mon ths establishes otherwise as a matter of law 
The next argument made by Defendants is that, a- a m r r e r o f l a w . no portion of the 
i >! in :!! iasi : p r i c e pa id by 1:1 le joii it \, ei itn n e is atti ibi uablc tc • tl ic pi :: c! ::,::is: : of good ' : 'ill Instead the 
disparity" between the purchase price and the book value of the tangible assets is cons idera t ion 
9 
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solely for the signing of a non-competition agreement h} i ^ ^ndaiii^ N*. liliei inc law nor the 
•business presumptively includes 'the sale of goodwill. In South Utah Mortuary v. Olpin 776 P.2d 
945 (I Jtah App 1989), the Court of Appeals stated: 
Goodwill cannot be transferred apart from the business with which 
it is connected. Consequently, the sale of a business presumptively 
includes the sale of the businesses goodwill, even though it is not 
specified. 
(Id. at 948, citing Nims, the Lam of I Jn fail Competition and I rademarks, 4th ed 194 > §1 3 
at 86 and 91.) ' 
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals relied on an earlier Utah Supreme Court case, 
Valley Mortuary? v. Fairbanks 22.5 P,2d 739, 745 (1950) wherein the Utah,. Supreme Court .:. " 
'[W]here a person sells a business and in connection therewith 
agrees not to engage in the same business, the obvious intent is to 
sell the gobdwill of the business.' 
766 P.2d at 948. 
Not only do the purchase documents and the bill of sale expressly list goodw ill. if they' 
did not,, Ihnv is ,i !HM! presumption nl itwliis] m uinl (im iiiivit lur m mm i onipcfifioii agreement 
is further evidence of an "obvious intent" to sell goodwill. Therefore, the Defendants argument 
must fail as a matter of law. 
. . h Defendants rely for fh i s «i i p i i n n c 11 if, t hv c m n I y 
reference to non-competition is found in the Joint Venture Agreement. The documents relating 
10 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERY" "7 
'Ml 
I ..-re by cemty thai I | day ot January, l wx s i caused to be hand delivered, a 
.:. i correct c~rv of the ' negoing Memorandum to the r~-!lc-.v::ic: 
Robert S. Campbell 
Perrin Love 
Kevin Egan Anderson 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TabE 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"•: US-
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557) 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (0099) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
:201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
FEB I 0 '9C: 
IN TIIK THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AMP 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBURG, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation/ general partners, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
C i v i l No. 910906316 CN 
Judge Hor xi icinson 
Defendants1 Motion '"• Summary Judgment ". t h e above 
c a p t i o n e d m a t t e r came OP f n r hea r i rv . i i>«•• (•'<«•• •••• i hn iin.irp ',?nt j ' i.• >>• 
Com l l In iiiniii! id 11. liomui i' W i l k i n s o n on T u e s d a y , l a n u a r y 2 ' , 
1998 ii'.ifendants and movants were represented 17 
t h e i r counsel , ~ •• I ' '"'arapbeJ I , 'r , ,iir,l Fan ursun 
of Campbell Mddck i .Sessions, t i f f s were r e p r e s e n t e d _., 
t h e i r counsel John C. Green. 
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•complaint , I s p r o p e r a s a ma t t e r of law 
The Court if(>riw< in.it inuuii inn I i letejiaaiiib Motion for 
•summary "-dgment t h a t t h e r e are no f a c t u a l I s sue s conce rn ing t h e 
: - wioci w i l l t o IHi ru I h i n l II.M i> The »Miinii m, ul I he 
^
+
 • " LI-P may lho f a c t u a l I s s u e s with r e s p e c t hi good 
w i l l . However, because thp pnme ' ",ai "• i] v* . NiiJu in. 
Center ' in n ) I I I in i m> ;t guod w i l l becomes 11 i 
For the r e a s o n s s e t fo r th h e r e i n Summary Judgment d i smi s s inq 
r;;air>t- f f s c l a i m s , KIMII n i i ' i i i i l in 1 , UP .ma uiu iiamu i >i hereliy 
g. 
'•'ED t h i s / £ day of January 
/ Honorable Homer- i^ Wi lk inson 
S t a t e D i s t r i c t 
\ 
*i 1 ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
; I hereby c e r t i f y t luit T am a membei il nm , >>, mpli i'*j 1 b\ "hk 
i 1 iw t i M" If Campbel" Mi.* * * Sess ions , One Utah Center, 1111 r t e e n t h 
-.'Floor I South Man. LLrti.'1 , .Ml1" I "h ' " "tan, . l i j . l , unci 
• •that in sa id r a p a c i t y and pu r suan t to Rule l>(b), FeU'ji i hite*., „e 
• '.Civil I i uceuiii i i i i i i H I M 1 i . of t he i.uxegoiiig ORDER 
i * 
I1, GRANT I Ni< DEPENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMITRY JUDGMENT was served upon: 
John C. Green, Esq. 
Kim M. Luhn, Esq. 
GREEN & LUHN# P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
~- Exchange Place 
-alt Lake City, V i 
by U. - Mai i 3tage ;.. *-: 
*a~*
 i wi January, --
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JOHN C. GREEN 1242 
KIM M. LUHN 5105 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake^City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership. LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D.. P.C. a Utah professional 
corporation and THOMAS D. 




AFFIDAVIT OF LLOYD MAYER 
Case No. 910906316CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Lloyd Maypf being first duly sworn under oath does hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I am an adult male over the age of twenty-one years. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit and if I were called 
to testify in court I would testify accordingly. 
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3. I am a licensed physical therapist and Prior to June of 1989,1 worked for Dr. Lonnie /*&&<• 
Paulos at his business address of 359 8th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. > > n • 
4. I am also familiar with Douglas Toole and Greg Gardner, whose company rented a 
facility from Dr. Paulos at 670 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
5. When Dr. Paulos terminated his relationship with Mr. Toole and Mr. Gardner in 
approximately June of 1989,1 moved to the 3900 South offices to work with physical therapy 
patients for Dr. Paulos and Dr. Rosenberg. 
6. When I went to work at the 3900 South facility the name "Salt Lake City Sports 
Medicine" was displayed on two signs located on the outside of the building. The signs remained 
unchanged until this lawsuit was filed. At that time, Dr. Paulos ordered the signs to be taken 
down. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this \ ^ day of January, 1998. 
.OYD MAYER ' LL
/ - 1 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO beforeIne thlsV^ day'of January, 1998. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
r 
L-W 
I hereby certify that on the (n^day of January, 1998.1 caused to be hand delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit to the following: 
Robert S. Campbell 
Perrin Love 
Kevin Egan Anderson 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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COURTESY UUPY 
MARK O. MORRIS (A4636) and 
CARY D. JONES (A1733) of 
SNELL & WJJLMER 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
i £ P 3




Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION INC. f/k/a 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah General 
Partnership and LONNIE E. 
PAULOS, M.D., P.C., a Utah Professional 
Corporation and THOMAS D. 
ROSENBERG, M.D., P.C., a Utah 
Professional Corporation, 
General Partners, 
AFFIDAVIT OF GENE OAKES 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
COUNTER-MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9109063160CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants. 
— o o O o o — 
SLCl-DECKARM-9954.1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gene Oakes, being over the age of 21 and being otherwise competent to testify, 
hereby deposes and states that he has personal knowledge of the following facts: 
1. I am a Certified Public Accountant and am the business office manager for 
The Orthopedic Specialty Clinic. 
2. I was the business office manager for Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine 
("Salt Lake Knee"), located at 359 8th Avenue and 670 East 3900 South (the "Center"), 
from August, 1987 to its closing in August of 1991. 
3. I was the business office manager of Salt Lake Knee at the time that the 
Plaintiffs and Defendants in the above lawsuit entered into the Termination Agreement and 
Purchase Agreement ("Termination Agreement") which terminated the Professional Services 
Contract and Lease Agreement which previously existed between the Plaintiff and Defendants 
in this case. I had an office at the 8th Avenue Center with Plaintiff and Defendants when 
they were located in the same building, and have had an office in the same building with 
Defendants since May, 1989. 
4. I was the business office manager for the Defendants at the time they entered 
into an agreement with IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("IHC Agreement"). 
5. After the Defendants and IHC Hospitals, Inc. entered into the IHC Agreement, 
those parties changed the name on the door of the Center, the marquis in the lobby and two 
SLCl - DECKARM - 9954 i 
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monument signs located on the building exterior at 39th South and at 7th East approximately 
one year before the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in October, 1991. 
Further Affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this JO_ day of August, 1993. 
GENEOAKES 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this3 jfcHayof August, 1993. 
«CVCX? 
i 
,• > ^ V 2 4 0 5 S c u l h • 
••v yanrnzzm Expires 3 
~ 3 SOO 3-W 
TARY PUBLIC 
Residing in^alt Lake County, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, on this the'7_xiay of September, 1993, to: 
John C. Green 
Kim Luhn, Esq. 
Liapis, Gray, Stegall & Green 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
"-YYW^ vl\,.4r^i 
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JOHN C. GREEN 1242 
KIM M. LUHN 5105 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership, LONNIE E. PAULOS, 
M.D., P.C, a Utah professional 
corporation and THOMAS D. 




AFFIDAVIT OF JAMBE BEERS 
Case No. 910906316CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jamie Beers being first duly sworn under oath does hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I am an adult male over the age of twenty-one years. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit and if I were called 
to testify in court I would testify accordingly. 
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3. During and after 1989,1 worked for Drs Lonnie Pauh> .::u Thomas D. Rosenberg as 
an ex-ray technician at their offices located at 670 East 3900 -••:::;. Sail Lake City, Utah. 
4. I am familiar with Doug Toole and Greg Gardner. *li<.? ; -au ;i physical therapy business 
located at the 3900 South address and worked with patients of D«v. ?au!os and Rosenberg. 
5. I am aware that in approximately June of 1989. Mr. Tooie and Mr. Gardner's business 
moved from the 3900 South address. 
6. Prior to and at the time of the move, there were signs on the exterior as well as the 
interior of the building advertising that the business being conchijrid was "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine". The signs remained unchanged until this lawsuit was ;iioj. At that time, Drs Paulos 
and Rosenberg caused the signs to be changed. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this /-? day of January, 1998. 
fa M^C-cC 
J> AMIE BEERS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this I I day -f" January. 1998. 
:L~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
--bite ^ 
:.u:&vj Exchange Pi. I 
.:ao:,v.,Jah8^111 j 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
il I hereby certify that on the J l L l day of January, 1998,1 caused to be hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit to the following: 
Robert S. Campbell 
Perrin Love 
Kevin Egan Anderson 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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